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Finality and Clarity Regarding Pending Claims for 
Attorney’s Fees: Duncan and the Superfluous 
54(b) Certification 
INTRODUCTION1 
When a trial is over, and if permitted by statute, the winning party 
will often ask the court to grant attorney’s fees.  Likely, the judge will 
not decide the claim for attorney’s fees at that time, but instead, will 
enter an order deciding only the merits of the substantive claims.  This 
leaves the issue of attorney’s fees undecided and reserved for a later 
decision.  What should the losing party do?  Can the losing party 
immediately appeal the decision on the merits?  Or must the losing party 
wait to appeal until the judge decides the pending attorney’s fees claim?  
Historically, North Carolina case law in this area has been unclear at 
best.  Recently, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
taken great strides to clarify the law determining when a judgment is 
final.  Recent decisions have brought clarity to the law, allowing 
practitioners to file timely appeals and enabling judges to issue more 
uniform decisions regarding the appealability of pending claims for 
attorney’s fees. 
Generally, the right to appeal from the ruling of a trial court is 
granted only by statute.2  The North Carolina General Statutes specify, 
with a few exceptions, that a party has the right to appeal from the final 
judgment of a trial court directly to the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina.3  If no right of appeal is present in the statutes, the appellate 
court, on its own motion, must dismiss the appeal, even if a party has 
not raised the question of appealability.4  Although the basics of 
appellate civil procedure are sufficiently spelled out in the statutes and 
explained in case law, the ambiguity regarding terms such as “final” and 
“interlocutory” make it difficult to ensure that a judgment is actually 
 
 1. The Author would like to thank Professor Matthew W. Sawchak for 
recommending the topic of this Comment and for inspiring dedication to writing it.  His 
thoughtful advice and support were invaluable during the writing process. 
 2. Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (N.C. 1950). 
 3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2013). 
 4. Bailey v. Gooding, 270 S.E.2d 431, 433 (N.C. 1980). 
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“final” before filing an appeal.  This is even more evident when a judge 
has issued an order on the merits that resolves all of the substantive 
issues of the claim, but leaves a claim for attorney’s fees pending. 
This Comment focuses on the jurisprudence surrounding the 
finality and appealability of an order that determines the merits of a 
claim but leaves a claim for attorney’s fees unresolved.  The legal 
landscape surrounding this issue in North Carolina has recently 
undergone drastic changes to resolve much of the confusion and 
contradiction.   
Part I begins with an introduction to general appellate procedure 
and explains what makes an appeal untimely or interlocutory.  Part II 
describes the two major ideological approaches in reaching such 
determinations and shows how other jurisdictions decide whether a 
merits order is final, and therefore, immediately appealable when an 
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees remains.  Part III traces the modern 
changes to the landscape of that same question in North Carolina.  
Finally, Part IV analyzes the recent Supreme Court of North Carolina 
decision in Duncan v. Duncan,5 which has entirely changed the analysis 
for unresolved claims regarding attorney’s fees in North Carolina.  The 
final Part of this Comment identifies some of the questions and issues 
that remain after the Duncan decision. 
I. GENERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
An order from a trial court is considered either “final” or 
“interlocutory.”6  A final order “disposes of the cause as to all the parties, 
leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial 
court.”7  A final order is, therefore, immediately appealable to the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina.8  An interlocutory order, on the other 
hand, “is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not 
dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in 
order to settle and determine the entire controversy.”9  There is no 
general right in the North Carolina General Statutes to immediately 
appeal an interlocutory order.10  The rationale for the rule against 
interlocutory appeals is to “prevent fragmentary, premature and 
 
 5. Duncan v. Duncan (Duncan II), 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013). 
 6. Veazey, 57 S.E.2d at 381. 
 7. Id. (citing Sanders v. May, 91 S.E. 526, 527 (N.C. 1917)). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. (citing Johnson v. Roberson, 88 S.E. 231, 231–32 (N.C. 1916)). 
 10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (2013). 
2
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unnecessary appeals[.]”11  By dismissing fragmented interlocutory 
appeals, the whole case will be presented to the appellate court in a 
single appeal from a final determination by the trial court.12 
There are, however, limited circumstances when parties can 
immediately appeal from an interlocutory order.13  The two most 
common exceptions to the rule against interlocutory appeals are the 
substantial right doctrine and the Rule 54(b) certification for immediate 
appeal.14  First, the North Carolina General Statutes grant the right to 
appeal directly to the court of appeals when an interlocutory order: 
(1) affects a substantial right;  
(2) effectually determines the action and prevents a later judgment from 
which an appeal may be taken;  
(3) discontinues the action; or  
(4) grants or refuses a new trial for a party.15   
Second, Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows a trial court to certify as “final” a “judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties” in an action for immediate appeal 
“only if there is no just reason for delay.”16 
A. The Substantial Right Doctrine 
Although the substantial right doctrine is not the subject of this 
Comment, a brief explanation may be helpful to understand one way to 
appeal from an interlocutory order of a trial court.  The Supreme Court 
of North Carolina describes the substantial right test as “more easily 
stated than applied.”17  The particular facts of each case and the 
procedural history must be analyzed to determine if a party’s substantial 
right has been affected, allowing for an immediate appeal.18  The party 
appealing must show: “(1) the judgment affects a right that is 
substantial; and (2) the deprivation of that substantial right will 
potentially” injure the party if not corrected before an appeal from the 
 
 11. Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc., 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (N.C. 1978). 
 12. Id. (quoting Raleigh v. Edwards, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (N.C. 1951)). 
 13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3). 
 14. See Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1994). 
 15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3); see also id. § 1-277. 
 16. N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (turning an interlocutory order that is not immediately 
appealable into a final order that is immediately appealable). 
 17. Waters, 240 S.E.2d at 343. 
 18. Id. 
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final judgment.19  “[T]he right to immediate appeal is reserved for those 
cases in which the normal course of procedure is inadequate to protect 
the substantial right affected” by the judgment.20 
The North Carolina General Assembly did not define the phrase 
“substantial right” in the statute that creates the right to appeal;21 instead, 
the courts must attempt to interpret this important phrase.  Because 
there is no precise definition, the determination of whether a right is 
substantial involves both a case-specific and a fact-specific inquiry.22  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has defined “substantial right” as a 
“legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished 
from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a 
man is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material 
right.”23  Some rights, or denials of rights, such as orders denying 
arbitration24 and orders disqualifying counsel,25 almost always affect a 
substantial right, and thus are immediately appealable. 
B. Rule 54(b) Certification  
The second most common exception to the rule precluding an 
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order is a certification of the 
merits order under Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Rule 54(b) states: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether 
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or when 
multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is no 
just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment.  Such 
judgment shall then be subject to review by appeal or as otherwise 
 
 19. Stafford v. Stafford, 515 S.E.2d 43, 45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Goldston v. 
Am. Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (N.C. 1990)), aff’d, 520 S.E.2d 785 (N.C. 1999). 
 20. Blackwelder v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 299 S.E.2d 777, 780–81 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1983). 
 21. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2013). 
 22. See Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (N.C. 1976) 
(inquiring into the facts of the related causes of actions to determine whether a 
substantial right was involved). 
 23. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 2280 (G. & C. 
Merriam Co. 1971)). 
 24. Pineville Forest Homeowners Ass’n v. Portrait Homes Const. Co., 623 S.E.2d 
620, 624 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 516 S.E.2d 
879, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 25. Ferguson v. DDP Pharmacy, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 323, 326 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735, 737 (N.C. 1990)). 
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provided by these rules or other statutes.  In the absence of entry of such 
a final judgment, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims or parties and shall not then be subject to review either 
by appeal or otherwise except as expressly provided by these rules or 
other statutes.26 
The designation that the judgment is final and that there is no just 
reason for delay is referred to as a “54(b) certification.”27  The certified 
judgment is then immediately appealable to the intermediate appellate 
court, even if there are still claims that require judicial determination by 
the trial court and is, by definition, interlocutory.28  This exception 
applies only to cases involving multiple parties or cases where one or 
more claim is presented, because only in those cases can claims still be 
pending after a judgment on the merits is ordered.29 
The Rule 54(b) certification exception does not abrogate the other 
exceptions allowed by statute for interlocutory appeals.  Instead, it gives 
parties an additional channel to pursue an immediate appeal from an 
order that does not adjudicate all of the claims in the action.30  The other 
exceptions identified in the North Carolina General Statutes sections 7A-
27(d) and 1-277, mentioned above, still apply if all of the requirements 
of a Rule 54(b) certification are not met.31 
Thus, the appeal permitted by Rule 54(b) is proper only if: (1) there 
are multiple parties or claims for relief in the action; (2) the trial court 
decides that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal; and (3) that 
determination is evidenced in the judgment.32  A trial court cannot 
simply decree its judgment a “final judgment” and make it immediately 
appealable under the rule.33  The judgment must in fact be “final” for a 
Rule 54(b) certification to apply, and appellate courts have the ability to 
review whether the certified judgment is indeed final.34 
 
 26. N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 27. See id.; see also First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 507 S.E.2d 56, 59 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
 28. N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (N.C. 1976). 
 31. Id. (holding that the Rule 54(b) reference to “other statutes” specifically means 
sections 1-277 and 7A-27(d)). 
 32. See N.C. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 33. Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (N.C. 1979). 
 34. Id. 
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At first glance, it appears easy to determine if a judgment is certified 
as final with the designation of no just reason for delaying an appeal.  As 
case law indicates, however, each word of the statute must be properly 
interpreted and followed for an interlocutory appeal to be proper.  
Questions often arise as to whether a judgment can be appealed from 
when all of the substantive claims in the action have been adjudicated, 
but a non-substantive claim, such as attorney’s fees, has been reserved 
for later adjudication.  The recent North Carolina appellate court 
decisions that trace this particular issue are the focus of the following 
Part.  These decisions shed light on when a party can appeal from a 
judgment if a pending claim for attorney’s fees remains. 
II. IDEOLOGIES COLLIDE: BRIGHT-LINE RULE VERSUS  
CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH 
Courts sometimes look to other jurisdictions in deciding which 
ideological approach to follow when determining whether a reserved 
claim for attorney’s fees makes an appeal interlocutory.35  Generally, 
there are two major ideological approaches: a bright-line rule or a case-
by-case determination. 
A. The Bright-Line Rule Approach 
In the federal system, the Supreme Court of the United States 
adopted a bright-line rule regarding pending statutory claims for 
attorney’s fees in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.36  The Court created 
a “uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney’s fees for the 
litigation in question does not prevent judgment on the merits from 
being final.”37  It stated that the strict rule was the most practical 
approach because it emphasized the importance of the “preservation of 
operational consistency and predictability in the overall application of 
[the federal appeal statutes].”38  The Court desired a system that required 
fewer questions regarding whether a pending claim for attorney’s fees 
was an issue of “merits” or “non-merits” and wanted attorneys and judges 
 
 35. See Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va. (Bumpers II), 695 S.E.2d 442, 446 (N.C. 
2010) (citing multiple cases from other jurisdictions), abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 
799, 800 (N.C. 2013). 
 36. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202–03 (1988). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 202. 
6
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to be able to adequately understand and consistently apply appellate 
rights.39 
In Ray Haluch Gravel Co., the Court recently decided the question 
of whether the bright-line rule of Budinich applies to contractual 
attorney’s fees as well as statutory contract fees.40  The two cases had 
“instructive similarities” because in both cases a trial court issued a 
merits order and left an outstanding claim for attorney’s fees.41  Unlike in 
Budinich, however, the attorney’s fees in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. were 
based on a contractual agreement, not a statute.42  Despite this 
difference, the Court held that attorney’s fees based on both statutory 
and contractual authority are the same and that neither precludes a 
merits order from being considered final.43  Keeping the continuity of 
the precedent established in Budinich was a major factor for the Court 
and there was “no reason to depart from [its] sound reasoning.”44  The 
“operational consistency and predictability stressed in Budinich” kept the 
federal landscape of final judgments clear and easy for both judges and 
practitioners to understand.45 
Although the bright-line rule is definitive and easy to understand, 
the result is that cases are more likely to be appealed twice: first on the 
merits order and then again on the order regarding the attorney’s fees 
claim.  The potential for multiple, piecemeal appeals is in tension with 
the judicial policy of efficiency, which entails only hearing one appeal 
per case.  Further, multiple appeals can make the finality of a case 
uncertain, not only for the court, but also for the parties involved.   
Many jurisdictions, including North Carolina,46 have followed this 
bright-line rule.47  Other states have decided that a different approach—
 
 39. Id. at 202–03. 
 40. Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs & Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. Ct. 773, 779–80 (2014). 
 41. Id. at 780. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  “Whether the claim for attorney’s fees is based on a statute, a contract, or 
both, the pendency of a ruling on an award for fees and costs does not prevent, as a 
general rule, the merits judgment from becoming final for purposes of appeal.”  Id. at 
777. 
 44. Id. at 780. 
 45. Id.  See also Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988). 
 46. See Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 801 (N.C. 2013) (holding that an unresolved 
claim for attorney’s fees does not prevent the merits order—the judgment resolving all 
substantive issues of a claim—from being final, and therefore immediately appealable 
under the statutes). 
 47. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 442, 446 (N.C. 2010) (citing multiple cases from 
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, South Dakota, and 
7
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the case-by-case approach, discussed below—is best and have concluded 
that “a judgment on the merits is not final when an unresolved request 
for attorney’s fees” is still pending.48 
B. The Case-By-Case Approach 
A case-by-case approach is the second major ideological approach 
used to determine if a reserved claim for attorney’s fees prevents a 
judgment from being final, and thus, immediately appealable.49  This 
approach requires a court to analyze whether the pending attorney’s fees 
request is closer to an “element of the substantive claim or merely an 
item of costs that is contingent upon the resolution of the substantive 
claim.”50  “If the claim for attorney’s fees is deemed an item of damages 
or an element of the substantive claim,” then the merits judgment is not 
considered final and, therefore, is not appealable until the pending claim 
for attorney’s fees is resolved.51  In contrast, if the claim for attorney’s 
fees is an item of costs or contingent upon prevailing on the merits of 
the substantive claim, the merits judgment is immediately appealable 
notwithstanding the pending claim for attorney’s fees.52  A minority of 
jurisdictions—including North Carolina prior to Duncan53—follow this 
case-by-case approach.54   
Although the case-by-case approach is not as definitive as the 
bright-line rule, it has its benefits.  The case-by-case approach allows 
judges to research and discern the relationship between governing 
common law or the relevant statute and the appeal for attorney’s fees.  
By understanding this relationship in cases where judges conclude that 
 
Washington that have all followed the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule that an 
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees does not prevent a judgment from being final), 
abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800. 
 48. Id. (citing cases from Nebraska, Ohio, and Utah that have held that a judgment 
on the merits is not final if there is still a pending claim for attorney’s fees). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 447. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013). 
 54. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 447 (citing multiple cases from Colorado, Wisconsin, 
and North Carolina that concluded whether the merits judgment was final was based on 
the relatedness of the claim for attorney’s fees to the substantive claim).  Although North 
Carolina had not explicitly stated that it followed a case-by-case approach, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina stated, “our Court of Appeals has engaged in a de facto case-by-
case approach [by] sometimes dismissing appeals having unresolved fee issues and 
sometimes hearing such appeals.”  Id. 
8
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attorney’s fees are an element of the substantive claim, they may 
properly resolve the case with only a single appeal.  This approach can, 
therefore, lower the number of multiple appeals within a single case 
because if the claim for attorney’s fees is so related that it should be 
litigated prior to appeal, then the parties are limited to a single appeal.55  
This approach promotes the traditional goal of efficiency in appellate 
procedure. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE IN NORTH CAROLINA:  
FROM BUMPERS TO HAUSLE 
After all of the substantive claims of an action have been decided 
and a party has won, the prevailing party will often move for payment of 
attorney’s fees from the losing party.56  The losing party, however, may 
have filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on the merits before the 
judge reached the issue of attorney’s fees.  Is an appeal in this context 
proper?  Is the order adjudicating only the merits a “final order,” 
allowing for the possibility of a Rule 54(b) certification?  If so, what does 
that mean for the claim for attorneys’ fees? 
The answers to these questions have not always been consistent in 
North Carolina.  Recently, however, the North Carolina appellate courts 
have taken strides to clarify some of the confusion and to establish a test 
for attorneys and judges alike to determine if an appeal is appropriate 
when a claim for attorney’s fees is pending. 
A. Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia  
The issue of whether an appeal is appropriate when a claim for 
attorney’s fees is pending came to the modern forefront in North 
Carolina in Bumpers v. Community Bank of Northern Virginia (Bumpers 
II).57  There, the plaintiff (Bumpers) filed a lawsuit alleging that the 
defendant (Community Bank) was liable under section 75-1.1 of the 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. The enactment of section 6-21.6 of the North Carolina General Statutes will only 
increase the frequency with which a party will move for attorney’s fees.  N. C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 6-21.6 (2013).  This enactment involves reciprocal attorney’s fees in business contracts 
and allows parties to agree to shift the responsibility for attorney’s fees by contract 
instead of relying on the “evidence of indebtedness” of section 6-21.2.  Id. § 6-21.2; see 
also Beth Scherer, U.S. Supreme Court: Undecided Contract-Based Attorneys’ Fees Motion 
Does Not Toll Deadline For Filing Notice of Appeal, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ncapb.com/2014/01/20/u-s-supreme-court-undecided-contractually-based-
attorneys-fees-motion-does-not-toll-deadline-for-filing-notice-of-appeal/. 
 57. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 443. 
9
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North Carolina General Statutes for violating North Carolina’s Unfair 
and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTP).58  Bumpers alleged that after 
responding to an advertisement for a second mortgage from Community 
Bank, Community Bank charged “duplicative closing fees for overlapping 
services” and other unreasonable and unnecessary fees in violation of the 
statute.59  Bumpers also requested attorney’s fees in relation to the UDTP 
violation, pursuant to section 75-16.1.60 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
Bumpers and found Community Bank liable on two of his section 75-1.1 
claims for “systematic overcharging” and duplicative “origination fees.”61  
Upon Bumpers’ request, the trial court certified the order under Rule 
54(b), specifically noting that “it had not considered an application for 
attorney fees under [section] 75-16.1, but nonetheless determine[d] that 
there is no just cause for delay and that the judgment resulting from this 
order should be entered as a final judgment.”62  The order further stated 
that the issue of attorney’s fees would be considered “separately.”63 
On appeal, the court of appeals relied on Tridyn Industries v. 
American Mutual Insurance Co.64 in holding that the attorney’s fees of a 
UDTP claim are considered part of the court costs and are ancillary to 
the section 75-1.1 claim.65  Therefore, the court concluded that “[i]t was 
improper for the trial court to certify its order as final as to a claim 
without first assessing attorney’s fees and other costs.”66  
When Bumpers II reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the 
court distinguished the facts from those in Tridyn Industries.67  It stated 
that here, as opposed to the partial summary judgment order in Tridyn 
Industries, all of the substantive issues of the UDTP claim had been 
adjudicated, “leaving only the issue of attorney’s fees.”68  The supreme 
court created a “bright-line rule that an unresolved claim for attorney 
 
 58. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2009)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 443–44; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1. 
 61. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 444. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Tridyn Indus. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 S.E.2d 443, 444 (N.C. 1979) (holding 
that a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability that leaves the issue of damages 
to be determined later is not immediately appealable). 
 65. Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va. (Bumpers I), 675 S.E.2d 697, 700 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 446 (citing Tridyn Indus., 251 S.E.2d at 448). 
 68. Id. 
10
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fees under section 75-16.1 does not preclude finality of a judgment 
resolving all substantive issues of a claim under section 75-1.1.”69  In 
sum, Bumpers II stands for the proposition that a ruling on all 
substantive claims under the UDTP statute is a “final judgment” that can 
be certified and, therefore, immediately appealed from under Rule 54(b), 
even if the issue of attorney’s fees remains unresolved.70 
The court adopted a bright-line rule because it believed such a rule 
would most effectively “promote judicial efficiency [and] foster 
meaningful appellate review,” while avoiding “waiver of appellate 
rights.”71  Before reaching this succinct rule, however, the court analyzed 
the case-by-case approach, which requires a court to determine if the 
attorney’s fees are best “characterized as an element of the substantive 
claim or merely an item of costs that is contingent” upon the requesting 
party prevailing on the substantive claim.72 
In this case-by-case approach, “if the claim for attorney’s fees is 
deemed an item of damages or an element of the substantive claim, the 
judgment on the merits is not final and appealable until the attorney fees 
request is resolved.”73  But, if the attorney’s fees claim is simply an item 
of costs, like that of section 75-16.1, or is contingent upon the 
requesting party prevailing on the merits of the substantive claim, then 
“a final judgment on the substantive claim is independently appealable,” 
even if the attorney’s fees claim has not been resolved.74  This analysis 
was important because, even though the court declared a bright-line rule 
for section 75-1.1 violations and the pursuant attorney’s fees claim, the 
court also used a case-by-case approach to determine that attorney’s fees 
are not part of the substantive claim.75   
 
 69. Id. at 448. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 446. 
 73. Id. at 447 (citing In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269, 271–72 (Colo. App. 2007) 
(holding that “final orders in a divorce proceeding that resolved property division and 
awarded spousal and child support but failed to resolve a statutory attorney fee claim 
were not appealable because the fee claim was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with other issues 
in the case”)). 
 74. Id. (citing Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936, 941–42 (Colo. 
1993)). 
 75. Id. at 448 (“[W]e briefly examine [section] 75–16.1 to determine how it 
interrelates with a judgment on the merits of a claim under [section] 75–1.1 for purposes 
of appeal.”). 
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Therefore, the court held that the merits order was independently 
appealable because it was properly certified under Rule 54(b).76  This 
approach, though clear for the section 75-1.1 category of cases, left 
courts with little guidance as to how to proceed when other types of 
claims were presented.  Was the substantive order resolving the merits of 
the claim appealable because it was final, or because the order in the case 
had in fact been certified under Rule 54(b)?77  In other words, the court 
failed to resolve whether an order resolving the substantive claims but 
leaving the issue of “non-substantive” attorney’s fees had to be certified 
under Rule 54(b) to be appealed from.  That question would arise in 
future cases, beginning with Lucas v. Lucas.78 
B. Lucas v. Lucas 
In Lucas v. Lucas, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina applied a 
Bumpers II-style case-by-case determination, but skirted the issue of 
whether certification under Rule 54(b) was required to perform that 
analysis.79  The Lucas case involved claims for divorce from bed and 
board, post-separation support, alimony, equitable distribution, and 
attorney’s fees.80  The trial court resolved the substantive claims for 
alimony and equitable distribution, but left unresolved the claim for 
attorney’s fees.81  The order stated that it “[was] certified as a final 
judgment pursuant to [R]ule 54(b).”82   
On appeal, the court held that when there is no specific finding in 
the merits order that “there is no just reason for delay,” as required by 
Rule 54(b), the appellate court “does not have jurisdiction to hear an 
interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(b).”83  The court concluded that the 
Rule 54(b) certification was defective because the order did not 
specifically state that “there is no just reason for delay” of the appeal.84  
Therefore, some other basis for appellate jurisdiction must exist in order 
 
 76. Id. at 448–49. 
 77. Id. at 448 (“[W]e hold that an order or judgment ruling on all substantive issues 
of a claim under section 75-1.1 is a final judgment that may be certified and appealed 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), notwithstanding any unresolved issue of attorney fees under 
section 75-16.1.”). 
 78. Lucas v. Lucas, 706 S.E.2d 270 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 79. See id. at 274 
 80. Id. at 272. 
 81. Id. at 273. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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for the court to hear the appeal.85  Instead of looking into whether 
another basis for jurisdiction—i.e., exception to the prohibition of 
interlocutory appeals—was present in this case, the court relied on 
Bumpers II to conclude that appellate jurisdiction existed.86 
The court interpreted the holding in Bumpers II to mean that the 
court “adopted a new rule for determining whether an appeal may 
proceed when the only remaining claim is one for attorneys’ fees.”87  This 
contradicted the precedent that “an appeal from an alimony order must 
be dismissed as interlocutory” when an attorney’s fees claim is still 
pending.88  The court stated that the supreme court in Bumpers II 
“specifically rejected the case-by-case approach in favor of a ‘bright-line 
rule’” where the finality of the order was determined by whether the 
attorney’s fees claim is a substantive issue as part of the merits.89  Under 
this interpretation of Bumpers II, the court concluded that a claim for 
attorney’s fees under the statute governing alimony “is contingent upon 
the claimant prevailing on [the merits of] the alimony claim,” thus, 
attorney’s fees are “not a substantive issue, or in any way part of the 
merits of [an alimony] claim.”90  Therefore, the court held that an 
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees under section 50-16.4 of the North 
Carolina General Statues did not preclude the trial court from 
determining that the merits order was final and that the appeal was 
properly before the court.91 
The court in Lucas, however, misinterpreted the “bright-line rule” of 
Bumpers II.  The Bumpers II bright-line rule dealt with an unresolved 
claim for attorney’s fees under a UDTP claim.92  The rule emerged after 
the court determined that the claim for attorney’s fees was ancillary to 
the UDTP claim.93  The rule, as stated in Bumpers II, was simply a case-
by-case determination of whether attorney’s fees are ancillary to the 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (citing Webb v. Webb, 677 S.E.2d 462, 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding 
that an appeal from an alimony order must be dismissed as interlocutory when there is 
still an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 274 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50–16.3A (2009); Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 
442, 448 (N.C. 2010), abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 444; see also supra notes 57–66 and accompanying 
text. 
 93. See Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d at 446–48. 
13
Fussell: Finality and Clarity Regarding Pending Claims for Attorney’s Fees
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014
4. FUSSELL 3.28.14 3/28/2014  12:41 PM 
352 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:339 
substantive claim;94 it was not an all-encompassing bright-line rule as the 
Lucas court stated.95  Along with the misinterpretation of the Bumpers II 
rule, the Lucas court also found that appellate review was proper.96  The 
court decided the merits of the appeal without first finding that appellate 
jurisdiction existed by a proper certification under Rule 54(b) or that the 
order affected a substantial right of the party.97   
Although the Lucas court relied on Bumpers II to create a new path 
to determine how a claim for attorney’s fees affects the finality of a 
judgment, Bumpers II did not provide that separate channel to obtain 
appellate jurisdiction.98  In Hausle v. Hausle, the court of appeals later 
described the Lucas court’s analysis as “circumvent[ing] the general rule 
prohibiting an appeal of an interlocutory judgment, unless the judgment 
is certified or affects a substantial right, so as to reach the merits by 
applying the Bumpers analysis to determine whether a claim for attorney 
fees precluded finality of the judgment.”99 
C. Duncan v. Duncan 
Case law regarding appellate review of an order reserving a pending 
claim for attorney’s fees continued to develop following Bumpers II and 
Lucas.  Although the focus of the next Part is the decision of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina in Duncan v. Duncan (Duncan II),100 a 
brief overview of the case as decided by the court of appeals (Duncan I) 
is discussed first.101 
The merits order in Duncan I involved equitable distribution and 
alimony.102  The trial court entered an order requiring the defendant to 
pay alimony to the plaintiff, but it did not resolve the claim for attorney’s 
fees, which was reserved for another hearing.103  The trial court did not 
certify the merits order that resolved the substantive issues under Rule 
54(b) for immediate appeal.104  On appeal, the court of appeals stated 
that in previous decisions there had been “uncertainty concerning the 
 
 94. See id. 
 95. Lucas, 706 S.E.2d at 273. 
 96. Id. at 274. 
 97. Id. at 273–74. 
 98. Hausle v. Hausle, 739 S.E.2d 203, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013). 
 101. Duncan v. Duncan (Duncan I), 732 S.E.2d 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 102. Id. at 391. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 392. 
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scope of the holding in Bumpers II.”105  It also specifically noted that the 
“bright-line rule” from Bumpers II applied only to violations of the UDTP 
statute.106  The court held that although the analysis from Bumpers II 
(regarding whether the claim for attorney’s fees was a substantive claim) 
may apply beyond the scope of UDTP claims, “we need not address the 
full applicability of Bumpers II to the facts in the present case because the 
trial court [here] did not certify the order for immediate appeal, as 
required by Bumpers II.”107 
The court in Duncan I attempted to clarify what was left to be 
determined after Bumpers II and further confused by Lucas.  The court 
clarified that in Bumpers II, the supreme court held, “the appeal before it 
was interlocutory but that the appeal was proper because the trial court 
had certified the order for immediate appeal.”108  The certification under 
Rule 54(b) was dispositive in determining if the appeal was 
appropriate.109  The court in Duncan I all but explicitly stated that the 
Lucas court misinterpreted the holding in Bumpers II.110   
The North Carolina appellate courts were beginning to clarify the 
issues regarding final judgments and pending claims for attorney’s fees.  
While the courts answered some of the questions created by Bumpers II, 
this area of appellate jurisdiction was about to get even more muddled 
with the holding in Hausle v. Hausle.111 
D. Hausle v. Hausle 
In Hausle v. Hausle, the trial court entered an order denying the 
plaintiff’s motion to modify the custody order, but it reserved its 
decision on the issues of modification of child support, contempt, and 
attorney’s fees for a future proceeding.112  Notably, it did not certify its 
order for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b).113 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Hausle v. Hausle, 739 S.E.2d 203, 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Duncan I, 
732 S.E.2d 390). 
 110. See Duncan I, 732 S.E.2d at 392 (emphasizing that the court has faced 
uncertainty regarding the scope of the holding in Bumpers II). 
 111. See Hausle, 739 S.E.2d at 208 (acknowledging that the law is unclear “regarding 
the finality of an order or judgment which preserves an issue of attorney fees”). 
 112. Id. at 205. 
 113. Id. at 206. 
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The court of appeals attempted to clarify when an appeal from a 
merits order is appropriate if a claim for attorney’s fees is still pending.114  
First, the court reviewed past cases discussing whether an appeal from a 
child custody order that affects a substantial right is properly before the 
appellate court.115  After analyzing the substantial right issues for child 
custody, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to make the initial 
showing that a substantial right had in fact been affected.116  The court 
further stated that although the substantial right “analysis would 
ordinarily suffice to determine that the appeal is interlocutory[,]” and 
thus improper, “because recent case law has complicated the issue, 
further discussion is necessary.”117  Accordingly, the court discussed the 
cases analyzed above, attempting to synthesize the decisions.118 
The court admitted that the law regarding the finality of an order 
that has an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees is “not a model of clarity” 
and that it was “difficult to reconcile Lucas with the general prohibition 
against the immediate appeal of interlocutory appeals.”119  Following the 
holding in Duncan I, the court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory 
because the merits order was not certified pursuant to Rule 54(b).120  
The court determined that the holding in Duncan I, which followed the 
rule of Bumpers II, was more consistent with established case law 
regarding interlocutory appeals.121 
Although the Hausle opinion itself was no “model of clarity,” it 
appeared to establish that a proper Rule 54(b) certification is required 
when a trial court issues an order deciding the merits of a case but 
reserving the issue of attorney’s fees for a future hearing.  Thus, under 
Hausle, an order is immediately appealable and properly before the court 
of appeals if: 
(1) the order fully resolved the merits of the claim, leaving only 
attorney’s fees to be determined;  
(2) the claim for attorney’s fees depended on the party prevailing on the 
merits and was not an element of the substantive claim; and 
(3) the trial court properly certified the order under Rule 54(b).122 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. at 206–08. 
 119. Id. at 208. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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The Hausle opinion was a way for the court to clarify the conflicting 
decisions and finally affirm that in order to appeal from a merits order, 
the order must be properly certified under Rule 54(b).  But, just as that 
step in the test was finalized, the requirements set forth in Hausle were 
jeopardized when the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted 
certiorari in Duncan II,123 discussed next. 
IV. FINALITY IN DUNCAN II: THE SUPERFLUOUS 54(B) CERTIFICATION 
The supreme court’s opinion in Duncan II swiftly changed the rules 
regarding the finality of judgment orders.  The opinion opened with a 
strong statement of purpose: “Today, we clarify the effect of an 
unresolved request for attorney’s fees on an appeal from an order that 
otherwise fully determines the action.”124 
The court of appeals had already concluded in Duncan I and Hausle 
that certification was required for an appeal to be proper, however, the 
defendant in Duncan II argued for a change in this rule.125  In his brief, 
the Defendant argued that the confusion surrounding the issue of the 
finality and appealability of an order when there is a pending claim for 
attorney’s fees should be resolved by a clear rule in order to reduce 
jurisdictional consequences, such as waiver of rights.126  The Defendant 
contended that North Carolina should follow the majority of other 
jurisdictions that have tracked the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States by providing a bright-line rule regarding the appealability 
of pending attorney’s fees.127  The Defendant urged the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina to conclude that an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees 
should not change the finality of a merits order that would hinder 
immediate appealability.128 
The court agreed with the Defendant, succinctly holding that an 
unresolved request for attorney’s fees does not prevent a judgment on 
the merits from being considered final for the purposes of an appeal, 
 
 123. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See supra notes 100–23; Petition for Discretionary Review at 3–7, Duncan II, 742 
S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 2013) (No. 450 PA12), 2012 WL 5509760 at *3–7. 
 126. Petition for Discretionary Review, supra note 125, at *3–4. 
 127. Id. at *15–16 (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199–
203 (1988) (“Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line rule, which accords 
with traditional understanding, that a decision on the merits is a ‘final decision’ for 
purposes of [section] 1291 whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for 
attorney’s fees attributable to the case.”)). 
 128. Id. at *1–6. 
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following the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Budinich.129  “Because attorney’s fees and costs are collateral to a final 
judgment on the merits, an unresolved request for attorney’s fees and 
costs does not render interlocutory an appeal” from the merits order.130  
“Once the trial court enters an order that decides all substantive claims, 
the right to appeal commences.”131  This rule is truly a “bright-line rule,” 
similar to the one the court attempted to adopt in Bumpers II.132 
The court decided that “[b]ecause an order resolving all substantive 
claims is a final judgment, Rule 54(b) certification is superfluous, and 
such a final order is immediately appealable as of right.”133  Therefore, 
when a trial court order adjudicates all of the substantive claims, leaving 
only the issue of attorney’s fees for a later proceeding, the party wishing 
to appeal does not have to seek a Rule 54(b) certification in order to 
immediately appeal because the order is considered final.134  As 
discussed in the first Part, a final order from a trial court is immediately 
appealable as a matter of right.135 
The court cleared up the confusion from the previous cases by 
holding that the bright-line rule applies to every case where a trial court 
enters a judgment on the merits but an unresolved issue of attorney’s 
fees remains.136  It also stated: “To promote clarity and uniformity, we 
disavow any language in [Bumpers II] that may be read to conflict with 
our holding in the case at hand.”137  In other words, there is no longer 
any reason for a court to determine whether the claim for attorney’s fees 
is contingent upon a party prevailing on the merits in order to decide if 
the pending claim for attorney’s fees is immediately appealable.138  The 
test from Bumpers II regarding whether the attorney’s fees claim is an 
 
 129. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800; see also Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199. 
 130. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.; see also Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 442, 448 (N.C. 2010), abrogated by Duncan II, 
742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013). 
 133. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800 (emphasis added) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ l–
277(a), 7A–27(c) (2011)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (N.C. 1950). 
 136. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 800–01. 
 137. Id. at 801. 
 138. Id.; see also Matt Leerberg, Attorneys’ Fees are Ancillary, and That’s Final, N.C. 
APP. PRAC. BLOG (June 13, 2013), http://www.ncapb.com/2013/06/13/attorneys-fees-are-
ancillary-and-thats-final/.  Leerberg summarizes: “This ‘bright-line rule’ goes a long way 
to cut through the confusion on this issue.  Note what is missing from the analysis:  you 
do NOT have to analyze whether the attorneys’ fees issue is dependent on or ancillary to 
the final merits order.”  Leerberg, supra. 
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element of the substantive claim or simply a cost added by the court is 
no longer necessary, according to Duncan II.139 
The Duncan II opinion was invaluable and arguably the best 
decision for the court to make, especially considering the confusing 
landscape of the previous case law and the trend by other jurisdictions to 
follow the bright-line rule.  This bright-line rule provides the easiest test 
for both practitioners and judges to understand and apply.140  
Practitioners and judges no longer have to examine the controlling 
statute and the trial court order to determine if the attorney’s fees are an 
element of the substantive claim before knowing whether the appeal is 
immediately available.  The risk of filing an untimely appeal is 
substantially lessened.  Attorneys no longer face the possibility of their 
untimely appeals being summarily dismissed and then being 
embarrassed in front of the judiciary, the bar, or their clients.   
Despite the growing clarity, Duncan II still leaves some problems 
and unanswered questions.  For example, now that an order resolving all 
claims is final and an immediate appeal is a right of the party, there is a 
chance that a case may have multiple appeals.  An aggrieved party will 
likely file for an appeal following the merits order because it will not 
want to risk waiving its appellate rights by waiting too long.  The merits 
order would be considered final and could be appealed from under 
Duncan II.141  If there is an unresolved claim for attorney’s fees, however, 
the party may have to appeal again following the resolution of the 
attorney’s fees claim.  Longstanding case law has sought to limit 
fragmented or partial appeals,142 yet, this new bright-line rule easily 
opens the door for a case to be appealed multiple times. 
A simple answer to this problem may be to ask the judge to delay 
entering a merits order until the attorney’s fees claim is decided.143  
Thus, only one order would be entered in each case and only one appeal 
would be needed to decide both the substantive claims and the attorney’s 
fees claim, eliminating the risk of fragmented or piecemeal appeals.144  
However, with crowded dockets, the claim for attorney’s fees may not be 
decided for months, leaving parties in a limbo state of no judgment at 
 
 139. Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 801; see also Bumpers II, 695 S.E.2d 442, 448 (N.C. 
2010), abrogated by Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d 799, 800 (N.C. 2013). 
 140. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (explaining 
that “Courts and litigants are best served by the bright-line rule”). 
 141. See Duncan II, 742 S.E.2d at 801. 
 142. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Leerberg, supra note 138. 
 144. See id. 
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all.  This may be especially problematic for family law issues where 
remedies may not be money damages, but instead parental rights. 
The circumstances under which a trial court can hear a motion for 
attorney’s fees after a party has filed a notice of appeal remain unclear 
under Duncan II.145  A question arises from the language of North 
Carolina General Statutes section 1-294, which states “[w]hen an appeal 
is perfected . . . it stays all further proceedings in the court below upon 
the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein; but 
the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the 
action and not affected by the judgment appealed from.”146  This leaves 
judges and practitioners to wonder if the analysis from Bumpers II and 
Hausle regarding the relationship between the judgment appealed from 
and the pending claim for attorney’s fees may still need to be considered 
in the appealability analysis.147 
CONCLUSION 
After years of confusing and contradictory rulings, Duncan II 
followed the lead of the federal courts and many other jurisdictions by 
creating a bright-line rule to determine the effect of an appeal when an 
unresolved claim for attorney’s fees remains.148  Now, it is established 
that attorney’s fees are ancillary to an order that adjudicates all other 
claims, and thus, a merits order is immediately appealable.  This change 
in the legal landscape, although still leaving some questions to be 
answered, not only cleared up the confusion from previous cases, but it 
also provided clear instructions regarding what is necessary to determine 
if an appeal is appropriate.  Because of this new clarity, practitioners and 
judges no longer need to spend time determining if a claim for attorney’s 
fees is ancillary to the substantive claims.  Instead, North Carolina now 
follows the majority of jurisdictions that apply the bright-line rule of 
Budinich.  
Lauren Fussell 
 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (2013). 
 147. See Leerberg, supra note 138 (analyzing section 1-294 and stating that “the 
Hausle court’s inquiry into the relatedness of the merits order and the attorney’s fee 
motion may be alive and well”). 
 148. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988). 
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